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ON THE LINGUISTIC BASIS FOR CONTEXTUALISM∗
Contextualism in epistemology is the doctrine that the proposition
expressed by a knowledge attribution relative to a context is deter-
mined in part by the standards of justification salient in that context.
The (non-skeptical) contextualist allows that in some context c, a
speaker may truly attribute knowledge at a time of a proposition p to
Hannah, despite her possession of only weak inductive evidence for
the truth of that proposition. Relative to another context, someone
may make the very same knowledge attribution to Hannah, yet be
speaking falsely, because the epistemic standards in that context are
higher. The reason this is possible, according to the contextualist, is
that the two knowledge attributions express different propositions.
The main advocates of contextualism have used the semantic
doctrine of contextualism to defend a certain response to the
problem of skepticism. According to it, the force of the skeptical
paradoxes is due to the presence of unrecognized context-sensitivity
in the language. When we are not discussing with skeptics, many
of our ordinary knowledge attributions are true, because what is
there at issue is a less demanding sense of knowledge. But the
consequence of engagement with the skeptic is that the content of
knowledge attributions shifts in a manner that is not recognized by
the interlocutors. In such a “skeptical” context, knowledge attri-
butions that may previously have expressed truths now express
falsehoods.
The contextualist therefore seeks to explain the force of skeptical
arguments by appeal to a feature of ordinary language. It is because
knowledge-attributions are context-sensitive that we are fooled by
skeptics into thinking that even in non-skeptical circumstances,
many of our knowledge attributions are false. The contextualist
claim is therefore not revisionary in character. The contextualist
does not claim that we ought to use “know” as a context-sensitive
expression, because that would somehow evade the skeptical para-
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doxes; it is not clear what such a position would amount to. Rather,
her dissolution of skepticism requires appeal to an actual feature of
ordinary knowledge attributions. For according to her, the presence
of this feature is what explains our actual inclination to accept
skeptical arguments.
My purpose in this paper is to investigate whether the features
contextualists impute to natural language knowledge ascriptions
are in fact all present. My discussion will not be exhaustive; I
aim simply to explore some of the apparent linguistic commit-
ments of contextualism. I begin with a brief review of some of
the intuitive linguistic evidence for contextualism. On the contextu-
alist view, knowledge relations come in varying degrees of strength,
depending upon the epistemic position of the knowledge-attributor.
This suggests that the word “know”, like adjectives such as “tall”
and “flat”, is gradable. My first task is to evaluate the claim that
“know” is gradable, and assess the significance of the results.
Secondly, I assess an argument for contextualism about “know”,
due to Stewart Cohen, which involves the gradable expression
“justified”. Third, I explore the background model of context sensi-
tivity assumed by the contextualist. Finally, I discuss whether the
contextualist can evade the problematic commitments by appeal to
ambiguity or loose talk.
1. MOTIVATING CONTEXTUALISM
As Stewart Cohen and Keith DeRose have emphasized, the most
powerful consideration in favor of contextualism is that it explains
certain relatively clear intuitions about the truth-conditions of
various knowledge-ascriptions. Here is one example of the kind of
argument at issue, due to Keith DeRose:
Hannah and her husband are driving home on a Friday afternoon. They plan to
stop at the bank on the way home to deposit their paychecks. But as they drive
past the bank, they notice that the lines inside are very long, as they often are
on Friday afternoons. Thinking that it isn’t very important that their paychecks
are deposited right away, Hannah says “I know the bank will be open tomorrow,
since I was there just two weeks ago on Saturday morning. So we can deposit
them tomorrow morning.” But then Hannah’s husband reminds her that a very
important bill comes due on Monday, and that they have to have enough money
in our account to cover it. He says, “Banks do change their hours. Are you certain
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that’s not what is going to happen tomorrow?” Hannah concedes, uttering “I guess
I don’t really know that the bank will be open tomorrow.”
This sort of example supports contextualism about knowledge
ascriptions, because it suggests that the propositions expressed by
one and the same knowledge-attribution may differ with respect
to two different contexts of use, even though the two contexts are
identical in all respects relevant for fixing the values of obvious
indexicals. Here is the example in more detail.
Consider a sentence like (1), as uttered by Hannah in the first
situation:
(1) I know that the bank is open tomorrow morning.
Before she realizes the importance of having a bank account flush
with resources by Monday, she utters (1). What she utters expresses
a proposition that seems perfectly true. The proposition concerns
a particular time, namely the next morning. She is then informed
about the pressing need for a full bank account. She then utters:
(2) I guess I don’t really know that the bank is open tomorrow
morning.
Again, it looks like Mary has expressed a proposition that seems
perfectly true, one that concerns the same time as the proposition
expressed by her previous utterance of (1). But (2) looks to be the
denial of (1). If we take these intuitions at face-value, we obtain a
contradiction.
Here are the two basic options one has to respond to this problem:
(a) One can reject the semantic significance of one of the
two intuitions. For example, one could deny semantic
significance to the intuition that the proposition semanti-
cally expressed by Hannah’s utterance of (1) is true.
Alternatively, one could deny semantic significance to the
intuition that the proposition semantically expressed by
Hannah’s utterance of (2) is true.
(b) One can deny that the proposition expressed by (2) is
really the denial of the proposition expressed by (1).
Contextualism about knowledge is a version of strategy (b).
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The contextualist maintains that the situation with (1) and (2) is
exactly like a situation in which Hannah utters (3) and John utters
(4):
(3) I am tired.
(4) I am not tired.
There is no threat of contradiction here, because the proposition
semantically expressed by John’s utterance of (4) is not the denial
of the proposition semantically expressed by Hannah’s utterance of
(3), despite the fact that the same words are used. For the word ‘I’ is
an indexical expression; it contributes potentially different semantic
contents to the semantic content of sentences containing it relative
to different contexts of use. Similarly, according to the contextualist,
the word “know” is an indexical expression. Relative to different
contexts of use, it expresses different relations between persons and
propositions. So, (2) is not the denial of the proposition semantically
expressed by (1), for the same reason that (4) is not the denial of
the proposition semantically expressed by (3). The word “know”
has a different content in Hannah’s utterance of (1) than it does in
Hannah’s utterance of (2).
In particular, for the contextualist, the word “know” has a content
that is a function of the epistemic standards in the context. When
Hannah finds out that she must cash her check before the day is
out, her evidence must satisfy a higher epistemic standard in order
for her to know that the bank is open. The contextualist accounts
for this by supposing that the word “know” changes its content in
the new context. It expresses a relation that Hannah stands in to a
proposition only if her evidence for that proposition satisfies this
higher epistemic standard.
For the contextualist, then, knowledge relations come in higher
or lower “strengths.” Knowledge attributions are thus comparable to
context-sensitive gradable adjectives, such as “tall” and “flat”. An
attribution of tallness is sensitive to a contextually salient scale of
height, as is an attribution to flatness. If what is at issue are basket-
ball players, then that brings in one rather high standard for “tall”; if
what is at issue are fifth-graders, then that brings in a considerably
lower standard for “tall”. In this sense, one could speak of tallness
relations coming in higher or lower “strengths” as well.
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2. IS “KNOW” GRADABLE?
Contextualists typically tell us, when introducing the thesis, that it
wouldn’t be at all surprising if predicates such as “knows that Bush
is president” turned out to be context-sensitive in the ways they
describe. After all, we are told, many natural language predicates
are context-sensitive. As Stewart Cohen (1999, p. 60) writes:
Many, if not most, predicates in natural language are such that the truth-value
of sentences containing them depends on contextually determined standards, e.g.
‘flat’, ‘bald’, ‘rich’, ‘happy’, ‘sad’. . . . These are all predicates that can be satisfied
to varying degrees and that can also be satisfied simpliciter. So, e.g., we can talk
about one surface being flatter than another and we can talk about a surface being
flat simpliciter. For predicates of this kind, context will determine the degree to
which the predicate must be satisfied in order for the predicate to apply simpliciter.
So the context will determine how flat a surface must be in order to be flat.
There is a great deal of evidence for Cohen’s claim that there is a
kind of predicate, of which ‘flat’, ‘bald’, ‘rich’, “happy”, and “sad”
may occur as a constituent, the semantics of which involve degrees
or scales. The reason that contextualists appeal to such predicates is
so that, given their frequency in the language, the claim that “know”
is a predicate of this kind will be unsurprising. How good is this
prima facie case for contextualism about “know”?
The predicates mentioned by Cohen – the “kind” of which he
speaks in his second to last sentence, are not a disjunctive sort. They
are gradable adjectives. Most of the gradable adjectives listed by
Cohen are (I believe) context-sensitive, such as “flat”, “tall”, and
“rich”.1 In talking about buildings, “is tall” may express a property
that it doesn’t express when talking about people. Furthermore,
this sub-class of gradable adjectives are context-sensitive in just the
way that Cohen and DeRose claim that knowledge-ascriptions are.
According to Cohen and DeRose, knowledge-ascriptions come in
varying degrees of strength. In other words, knowledge-ascriptions
are intuitively gradable. Contextualists speak, as their theory
suggests, of higher and lower standards for knowledge. Gradable
adjectives are the model for gradable expressions. It is therefore
no surprise that epistemologists since Unger (1975, Chapter 2) and
Lewis (1986) have been exploiting the analogy between “know” and
context-sensitive gradable adjectives such as “flat” and “tall”. But,
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as I will argue in this section, the attempt to treat “know” as a grad-
able expression fails. This casts suspicion upon the contextualist
semantics for knowledge ascriptions. First, it shows that one cannot
appeal to the context-sensitivity of words like “tall”, “flat”, and
“rich” to justify the context-dependence of knowledge-ascriptions.
Secondly, it casts doubt upon the claim that knowledge comes in
varying degrees of strength, a core claim of contextualism.
There are two linguistic tests for gradability. First, if an expres-
sion is gradable, it should allow for modifiers. For example,
predicative uses of comparative adjectives allow for modification,
as in:
(5) a. That is very flat.
b. That is really flat.
c. John is very tall.
d. John is really tall.
Secondly, if an expression is gradable, it should be conceptually
related to a natural comparative construction. So, for “flat”, “tall”,
and “small” we have “flatter than”, “taller than”, and “smaller than”.
Both of these features are to be expected, if underlying the use of the
relevant expression is a semantics involving degrees or intervals on a
scale. For instance, the semantic effect of a modifier such as “very”
on a word like “tall” is to increase the contextually salient degree on
the scale of height that an object must exceed in order to satisfy the
predicate.2
The claim that knowledge ascriptions are gradable fits elegantly
into the contextualist explanation for, say, DeRose’s bank case
discussed in the previous section. For in Hannah’s final utterance,
she claims that she does not really know that the bank is open. It is
natural to read “really” here as a degree modifier, as in the examples
in (5). That is, it is natural to read this discourse as providing
evidence for the gradeability of “know”. Over the course of the
discourse, Hannah asserts that she knows that the bank is open, but
also asserts that she doesn’t really know that the bank is open. That
is like someone asserting that Bill is tall, but conceding that Bill is
not really tall.
But the explanation of the bank case that appeals to the grada-
bility of knowledge is not correct. As the above example suggested,
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negations of degree-modifier uses of “really” can be conjoined with
assertions of the unmodified forms without inconsistency:
(6) a. John is tall, but not really tall.
b. Michigan is flat, but not really flat.
In contrast, the same facts do not hold of the use of “really” when
appended to a knowledge-ascription (“#” expresses oddity):
(7) # If the bank is open, then John knows that the bank is
open, but doesn’t really know that the bank is open.
The sentences in (6) are perfectly natural. In contrast, (7) is very
odd. This suggests that the “really” that occurs in the above
description of the bank case is not a degree modifier.3
Indeed, prima facie, propositional knowledge ascriptions are not
gradable. First, knowledge ascriptions do not seem to allow for
modification:
(8) a. *John very knows that penguins waddle.
b. *John knows very much that penguins waddle.
Second, there is no natural comparative conceptually related to
“know”. The following locutions are deeply strained:
(9) a. ??John knows that Bush is president more than Sally
knows it.
b. ??Hannah knows that Bush is president more than she
knows that Clinton was president.
If the semantics of “know” did involve scales, it would be mystery
why there wouldn’t be a comparative form of “know” available to
exploit the scale.
It has been noted before that ascriptions of propositional knowl-
edge are not gradable (cf. Dretske, 1981, Chapter 5). However,
the data surrounding knowledge ascriptions is more complex than
these prima facie considerations suggest. There are several construc-
tions that suggest that knowledge ascriptions are, despite initial
appearances, gradable. In the remainder of this section, I provide
a complete case that knowledge ascriptions are not gradable, and
draw some morals for contextualism about “know”.
One might think that knowledge-ascriptions are gradable on the
basis of the obvious felicity of the following sort of construction:
(10) a. John knows Bill better than Mary does.
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b. Hannah knows logic better than John does.
But in the sentences in (10), “know” does not express a rela-
tion between a person and a proposition. These sentences are
not propositional knowledge ascriptions; rather the occurrences of
“know” in them express the acquaintance relation, what would be
expressed in German by “kennen” rather than “wissen”. It is only the
gradeability of propositional knowledge ascriptions that is it issue in
contextualism in epistemology.
However, “know” can marginally occur with “very much” or less
marginally with “very well”, as in:
(11) a. ?I very much know that Bush is president.
b. I know very well that Bush is president.
But it is doubtful that these occurrences of “very much” and “very
well” are genuine semantic modifiers of the knowing relation, rather
than pragmatic indicators. In this sense, these constructions are
similar to:
(12) 2 is very much an even number.
Decisive evidence for this comes from several sources. First, note
the unacceptability of negating the constructions in (13):
(13) a. *I don’t know very much that Bush is president.
b. *I don’t know very well that Bush is president.
The unacceptability of the sentences in (13) contrasts with the
naturalness of negating the verb phrase in a case in which “very
much” is clearly modifying the verb:
(14) I don’t like Bill very much.
Secondly, “know” is only with great awkwardness combined with
“very well” in non-assertoric speech acts. Contrast the sentences in
(15) with (16):
(15) a. ??Do you know very well that Bush is president?
b. *Do you know very much that Bush is president?
(16) Do you like Bush very much?
So, the sentences in (11) are clearly not cases where the degree of
knowing is operated on by “very much” or “very well”.
Defenders of contextualism might hold that “better than” rather
than “more” is the comparative relevant to “know”, as in:
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(17) Hannah knows better than anyone that she is poor.
But here again, the construction means that Hannah is familiar with
the fact more than anyone else – e.g. she lives with the conse-
quences.4 More importantly, “better than anyone” is idiomatic. For
example, consider the oddity of:
(18) a. ??Hannah knows better than three people that she is
poor.
b. *Hannah doesn’t know better than anyone that she is
poor.
So, “better than anyone” is an idiomatic construction, one from
which we can infer little about the semantics of “know”.5
Furthermore, none of the non-philosopher informants I asked
found the following acceptable, though they disagreed amongst
themselves which was worst:
(19) a. ??John knows that Bush is president better than Mary
does.
b. ??John knows that Bush is president better than Bill
knows that Clinton is a Democrat.
Furthermore, all of my informants reported a strong difference in
acceptability between these sentences, on the one hand, and the
perfectly acceptable:
(20) a. John likes Bill more than Mary does.
b. John likes Bill more than Mary likes John.
So “better than” is not a natural way to express compar-
isons between levels of epistemic position with “know”. If the
semantics of “know” did involve scales of epistemic strength, then
there should be uncontroversially non-idiomatic comparisons and
modifications.6
One might think that these facts about ‘know’ have syntactic
rather than semantic explanations. Perhaps sentences like (8) and
(9) and those in (13) are deviant because verbs that take sentential
complements grammatically do not allow for comparisons or inten-
sifiers. But consider “regret”, a factive verb in the same syntactic
category as “know”:
(21) a. Hannah very much regrets that she is unemployed.
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b. Hannah doesn’t regret very much that she is unem-
ployed.
c. Hannah regrets very much that she is unemployed.
d. Hannah regrets that she is unemployed very much.
Here, the degree of regret clearly seems to be modified by “very
much”. Furthermore, “regret” easily allows for comparisons:
(22) Hannah regrets that she is unemployed more than she
regrets that she is unpopular.
This shows that the lack of straightforward comparatives or degree
modifiers has nothing to do with the syntax, or even the factivity, of
“know”. There are syntactically similar expressions whose link to
degrees and scales is far more plausible.7
It is also worth mentioning that other expressions upon which
one might be tempted to base the context-sensitivity of “know” are,
unlike “know”, also gradable. So consider epistemic modals.8 A
contextualist might understandably wish to appeal to the apparent
context-sensitivity of epistemic modals to justify the apparent
context-sensitivity of knowledge-ascriptions. But one problem with
this strategy is that epistemic modals, unlike knowledge-ascriptions,
are intuitively gradable:
(23) a. It is very likely that I will publish more papers on this
topic.
b. It is more possible that Hannah will become a philos-
opher than it is that she will become a mathematician.
So the analogy between epistemic modals and “know” is almost as
strained as the analogy between context-sensitive gradable adjec-
tives and “know”.
The evidence concerning gradeability is more complicated when
one considers the deverbal adjective “known”. But even here, there
does not appear to be a good case for a semantics involving a scale
of epistemic strength. This adjective, unlike its verbal relative, does
give rise to comparisons and modifications. But they are not of the
relevant sort. So, for example, consider:
(24) a. That broccoli is low-fat is better known than that
broccoli prevents cancer.
b. That broccoli is low-fat is well known.
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(24a) does not mean that there is more evidence that broccoli is
low-fat than that broccoli prevents cancer; rather, it means that the
fact that broccoli is low-fat is more widely known than the fact that
broccoli prevents cancer. Similarly, (24b) means, not that there is a
lot of evidence that broccoli is low-fat, but that it is widely known
that broccoli is low- fat. Evidence for this hypothesis comes from
the fact that while (25a) is perfectly acceptable, (25b) sounds quite
odd:
(25) a. That broccoli prevents the flu is well-known, but ill-
understood.
b. ?That broccoli prevents the flu is well-known, though
few people know it.
Furthermore, as Tamar Gendler has pointed out to me, instances of
(26) are quite odd:
(26) It is well known that p, and less well-known that q, but
more people know that q than know that p.
This data is explicable on the assumption that the only available
reading for “well-known” is widely known. So, while the data is
more complex here, the adjectival relative of ‘know’, on the rare use
of it where it expresses propositional knowledge, does not to be an
obvious candidate for analysis via degrees on a scale of epistemic
strength.
Another potential source of evidence for the gradability of
“know” comes from its use in certain kinds of embedded questions.
Consider, for example:
(27) a. John knows how to swim well.
b. John knows how to ride a bicycle better than Mary
does.9
c. Hannah knows where Texas is better than John does.
It is quite plausible that these are attributions of propositional
knowledge.10 If so, one might think that this suggests that knowl-
edge is gradable after all. However, in these cases, what is being
compared are answers to questions. In each case, one person is said
to have a better answer to a certain question than another; the answer
Hannah has to the question “Where is Texas?” is better, or more
complete, than the answer John has.11 So, embedded questions do
not provide evidence for the gradeability of knowledge claims.
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Contextualists often write as if the prima facie case for the
contextual sensitivity of “know” is strong, citing the relatively
uncontroversial context-sensitivity of adjectives such as “tall”,
“flat”, and “small”. Their purpose in so doing is to shift the burden
of proof from their shoulders to their opponents; if “many if not
most predicates of natural language are context-dependent”, then
someone who claims that “know” is context-dependent does not
suffer from a large burden of proof. My point in this section has been
to emphasize that these arguments do not suffice to lift the burden of
proof from the shoulders of the contextualist about “know”. The fact
that the semantic contents of a subclass of gradable adjectives are
sensitive to contextually salient standards is irrelevant to the claim
that “know” has a similar context-sensitive semantics.
In fact, we may draw a stronger conclusion from the above
discussion. Natural language expressions that are semantically
linked to degrees on scales exploit this link in a variety of recog-
nizable ways – by allowing for comparisons between degrees on
the scale, and by allowing modifications of the contextually salient
degree on the scale. If the semantic content of “know” were sensi-
tive to contextually salient standards, and hence linked to a scale of
epistemic strength (as “tall” is linked to a scale of height), then we
should expect this link to be exploited in a host of different construc-
tions, such as natural comparatives. The fact that we do not see such
behavior should make as at the very least suspicious of the claim
of such a semantic link. Thus, an investigation into the context-
sensitivity of predicates such as “is tall”, “is small”, and their ilk
adds to, rather than removes, the burden of proof on contextualists
about “know”.
3. THE COHEN ARGUMENT FOR CONTEXTUALISM
Propositional knowledge ascriptions are not gradable. But some
contextualists have claimed that it does not matter to contextualism
whether or not they are.
Does knowledge come in degrees? Most people say no (though David Lewis
says yes). But it doesn’t really matter. For, on my view, justification, or having
good reasons, is a component of knowledge, and justification certainly comes in
degrees. So context will determine how justified a belief must be in order to be
justified simpliciter.
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This suggests a further argument for the truth of the contextualist’s claim
about knowledge. Since justification is a component of knowledge, an ascrip-
tion of knowledge involves an ascription of justification. And for the reasons just
indicated, ascriptions of justification are context-sensitive. (Cohen, 1999, p. 60)
In this section, I will argue that Cohen has not freed the contextualist
from the thesis that “know” comes in degrees. Then, I will argue that
Cohen’s attempt to derive the context-sensitivity of “know” from the
context sensitivity of “justified” fails.
Cohen’s argument for the context-sensitivity of “know” has
roughly the following structure:
COHEN
Premise 1. Gradable expressions are context-sensitive.
Premise 2. So, we can expect the gradable term “justified”
to be context-sensitive.
Premise 3. “S knows P” means in part what is meant by
“P is justified for S”
Conclusion. So the truth of “S knows P” depends upon
context.
If this argument is sound, then it is difficult to see how Cohen is
justified in claiming that “it doesn’t really matter” whether “know”
comes in degrees. For if this argument is sound, then surely so is:
COHEN*
Premise 1. Gradable expressions are sensitive to contextu-
ally salient scales.
Premise 2. So, we can expect the gradable term “justified”
to be sensitive to contextually salient scales.
Premise 3. “S knows P” means in part what is meant by
“P is justified for S”
Conclusion. So the truth of “S knows P” is sensitive to
contextually salient scales.
So it seems that Cohen has not discovered a way of freeing the
contextualist from the view that “know” comes in degrees.
However, a more pressing task is to evaluate the soundness
of Cohen’s argument from the gradability of “justified” to the
conclusion that “know” is context-sensitive.
The word “justified” is certainly gradable. We may say “My
belief that Bush is a Republican is more justified than my belief that
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I will eat Indian food tomorrow.” It does not, however, follow that
“justified” is context-sensitive. Some expressions are gradable, yet
not context-sensitive. Consider, for example, the expression “taller
than six feet.” This expression is clearly not context-sensitive. Yet
it is gradable; someone may be much taller than six feet. So, the
expression “taller than six feet” is gradable, since it can be modified
by a degree word such as “much”. But it is not context-sensitive. So
gradability does not entail context-sensitivity, and premise 1 is false.
So the conclusion that “justified” is context-sensitive does not
follow from the premise that it is gradable. My own view is that
“justified” is gradable, but not context-sensitive, much like the
expression “taller than six feet.” For a belief to be justified means
that it is justified over the context-invariant degree of justifica-
tion, just as to be taller than six feet tall is to be taller than the
context-invariant degree of height of six feet.
The second crucial step in Cohen’s argument is premise 3. The
claim accepted by most epistemologists is that, in the analysis of the
knowledge relation, some justification property appears. That is:
The Knowledge-Justification Thesis
Some justification property is part of the conceptual
analysis of the knowledge relation.
The Knowledge-Justification Thesis is an informal way of making
explicit the thesis that knowledge is analyzed in terms of justifica-
tion.
However, if premise 3 is another way of stating the Knowledge-
Justification Thesis, then COHEN is not valid. For the Knowledge-
Justification Thesis is not a claim about a relation between the
word “know” and the word “justified.” It is rather the claim about
the relation between the knowledge relation and some justification
property. From such a claim, coupled with the thesis, that I will for
the moment grant for the sake of argument, that the word “justified”
is context-sensitive, nothing follows about the context-sensitivity of
the word “know.”
One might think that there is prima facie case to be made, from
the fact that a certain term t contains in the analysis of what it
expresses a property that is expressed by a context-sensitive term t′,
that t is therefore context-sensitive. But this does not seem in general
to be true. Consider the term “vacuum”. A plausible analysis of the
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notion of being a vacuum involves being completely empty. But the
property of being empty is expressed by the context-sensitive word
“empty.” This does not entail that “vacuum” is context-sensitive.12
Another example is the expression “John’s enemy.” There is at least
a prima facie case that this expression is not context-sensitive.13 But
analyzing the notion of being John’s enemy involves appealing to
the notion of being an enemy, which is expressed by the context-
sensitive word “enemy” (in one context, it may mean an enemy of
x, and in another context, an enemy of y).
So, if premise 3 is supposed to reflect the Knowledge-
Justification Thesis, it does not allow Cohen to draw the conclusion
that “know” is context-sensitive from the premise that “justified”
is context-sensitive. One might think that, intuitively, an attribution
of knowledge entails an attribution of justification. But even if this
were true, it would not obviously help Cohen. For note that the
following thesis is not sufficient for Cohen’s purposes:
For any context c, if what is expressed in c by a sentence
of the form ‘x knows that p’ is true, then what is expressed
in c by a sentence for the form ‘x is justified in believing
that p’ is true.
This Thesis, together with Premises 1 and 2 of COHEN, does
not entail that “know” is context-sensitive (granting the context-
sensitivity of “justified”). For it may be (and is, according to the
skeptic) that knowledge entails the highest kind of justification. If
so, a true knowledge-ascription will always entail a true justifica-
tion-ascription, even though “know” is not context-sensitive.
The thesis Cohen requires to move from the context-sensitivity
of “justified” to the context-sensitivity of “know” is rather the
following:
The Metalinguistic Knowledge-Justification Thesis
For any context c, the word “know” expresses a relation
that, relative to that context, contains as a component the
property expressed by the word “justified”, relative to c.
However, it is unclear how to argue for the Metalinguistic
Knowledge-Justification Thesis. It does not appear to be a reformu-
lation of an innocuous epistemological thesis. Furthermore, there
are special reasons to think that the contextualist is in a difficult
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position with respect to providing an argument for this thesis. For
the contextualist account of skepticism involves the hypothesis that
we are often mistaken about the semantically relevant features of
the context. So the contextualist cannot argue for the Metalinguistic
Knowledge-Justification Thesis by appeal to intuitions about
cases.
So, there is no clearly persuasive route from the fact that “justi-
fied” is a gradable adjective to the context-sensitivity of “know”.
First, the fact that “justified” is gradable does not entail that it
is context-sensitive. Indeed, it is perfectly plausible to hold that
“justified” is gradable and not context-sensitive. Secondly, even if
“justified” is context-sensitive, and knowledge is analyzed in terms
of justification, it does not follow that “know” is context-sensitive.14
4. CONTEXTUALISM AND THE DISCOURSE MODEL OF
CONTEXT-DEPENDENCE
Contextualists typically speak as if there is one contextual standard
in a context for all context-sensitive expressions in a discourse.
So, for example, DeRose regularly speaks of “how high or low
the standards for knowledge are set” in a conversational situation
(1995). But this is not in general a good description of how context-
sensitive expressions work. Rather, the context-sensitivity is usually
linked to the term itself, rather than the whole discourse. If the
discourse model of context-dependence is incorrect, this raises
serious worries for the contextualist. In this section, I give some
reasons to think that the discourse model is incorrect, and explain
the problems that this raises for the contextualist.
In the case of virtually all terms that occur in semantically
context-dependent constructions, the context-sensitivity is linked
either to the term, or some element associated with that term. Let
us begin with the case of context-sensitive gradable adjectives.
Suppose John, who is very small for his age, identifies with small
things. He has a picture on the wall in his bedroom of an elephant
fighting off a much larger elephant. He also has a framed tiny
butterfly on his wall. When he is asked why he has both things hung
up, he says:
(28) That butterfly is small, and that elephant is small.
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John in fact also has a fondness for flat things. On his wall is a
picture of a field in Kansas, and on his desk is a rock. When asked
why he has both, he replies:
(29) That field is flat, and this rock is flat.
Now imagine a picture of a butterfly that’s surrounded by much
smaller butterflies; it’s huge for a butterfly. It’s next to a picture of an
elephant that’s surrounded by much larger elephants. The following
is a good description of the situation:
(30) That butterfly is large, but that elephant isn’t large.
This sort of contextual shift is present in a variety of context-
sensitive expressions other than gradable adjectives. For example,
we see this behavior with demonstratives, context-sensitive deter-
miners, quantified noun phrases, and modal auxiliaries. Here is a
case with demonstratives (imagine two different demonstrations):
(31) This is larger than this.
Here is a case for the context-sensitive determiner “many”:
(32) In Syracuse, there are many serial killers and many
unemployed men.
In this case, the contextual determinants for the denotation of
‘many’ change within a clause. What counts as “many” for serial
killers is not what counts as “many” for unemployed men. The same
phenomenon occurs with quantified expressions, as (33) can express
the proposition that every sailor on one ship waved to every sailor
on another (Stanley and Williamson, 1995, p. 294):
(33) Every sailor waved to every sailor.
The same phenomenon occurs with modal auxiliaries, which can
change interpretation within a clause:
(34) a. I couldn’t bench press 100 pounds, though with regular
physical training, I could.
b. John can lift the block that Mary says he can.
In (34a), the two different uses of “could” express a narrower
and wider sense of physical possibility, respectively. (34b) has a
reading according to which it expresses the proposition that John
is physically able to lift the weight that Mary says he is permitted
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to lift. That is, (34b) allows a reading in which the first “can”
is physical possibility, and the second is permissibility. For all
of these categories of expression, then, the discourse model of
context-sensitivity is incorrect.
With a host of other context-dependent words, one detects similar
behavior. Consider, for example, the word “nearby”. For a person
with a car, a place can be nearby, that isn’t nearby for a person
without such a rapid mode of transportation. Indeed, the following
expresses a truth (considered as uttered in Ann Arbor):
(35) If you have a car, Detroit is nearby, but if you’re on foot,
Detroit isn’t nearby.
Similarly, consider a relational noun such as “enemy”; to be an
enemy is to be an enemy of x, for some x. Now consider:
(36) John has an enemy, and Bill has an enemy.
In the case of (36), what is said is that John has an enemy of John,
and Bill has an enemy of Bill. So, in the case of both “nearby” and
“enemy”, the interpretation of the relevant contextual parameter can
change within a sentence. For such expressions too, the discourse
model of context-dependency is incorrect.15
It is no surprise that context-sensitive expressions typically allow
for standard-shifts within a clause. In each case, the context-
sensitivity is linked not to the discourse, but to the particular
context-sensitive term. So what one is speaking about when one
speaks of the “standard of tallness” relevant for evaluating a partic-
ular use of “is tall” is simply the degree of tallness that is associated
with the expression “tall” (or some element closely associated with
it) by whatever semantic mechanism one exploits.
The discourse model of context-sensitivity is particularly inade-
quate in the case of the version of contextualism advocated in
Lewis (1996). According to Lewis, the semantics of the word
“know” invokes universal quantification over possibilities. Lewis
then exploits facts about natural language universal quantification
to motivate contextualism about “know”:
Finally, we must attend to the word “every”. What does it mean to say that every
possibility in which not-P is not eliminated? An idiom of quantification, like
“every”, is normally restricted to some limited domain. If I say that every glass is
empty, so it’s time for another round, doubtless I and my audience are ignoring
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most of all the glasses there are in the whole wide world throughout all of time.
They are outside the domain. They are irrelevant to the truth of what was said.
Likewise, if I say that every uneliminated possibility is one in which P, or words
to that effect, I am doubtless ignoring some of all the uneliminated alternative
possibilities that there are. They are outside the domain. They are irrelevant to the
truth of what was said. (Ibid., p. 553)
So, Lewis deduces contextualism about “know” first from the claim
that “know” involves universal quantification over possibilities, and
secondly from the fact that natural language quantification is typi-
cally restricted. But (as (33) demonstrated) it is a well-established
fact that different occurrences of the same quantified expression
can be associated with different domains (Soames, 1986, p. 357;
Stanley and Williamson, 1995, p. 294; Stanley and Szabo, 2000,
p. 249). Given that Lewis’s contextualism flows from facts about
natural language quantification, it should follow that two different
occurrences of “know” within the same discourse should be able to
be associated with different sets of possibilities (say, a set including
quite remote possibilities, and a set only including quite close
possibilities).
Why is it important that contextualists are operating with the
wrong model of context-sensitivity? First, if this is the incorrect
model for context-sensitivity, then it opens the contextualist up to
a number of objections that she does not otherwise face. Secondly,
if this is the incorrect model for context-sensitivity, some of what
contextualists say about the virtues of their theories over other
theories falls by the wayside. I will substantiate these points in turn.
If “know” behaves like context-sensitive gradable adjectives,
quantifier phrases, context-sensitive determiners, or modals, then
we would expect it to be smoothly acceptable to associate different
standards of knowledge with different occurrences of “know”, just
as we associate different degrees of height with different occur-
rences of “tall”. So, if contextualism were true, we should expect
the following to be fine:
(37) If there is an external world, many normal non-
philosophers know that there is, but, by contrast, no
epistemologists know that there is.
If “know” could have different standards, then one would expect an
utterance of (37) to felicitously assertible and true, just as utterances
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of (28)–(36) are. For “large” means one thing when predicated of a
flea, and quite another when predicated of an elephant, and “many”
means one thing when it occurs with “unemployed men”, and quite
another when it occurs with “serial killers”. So, if “know” is context-
sensitive in a similar manner, one would naturally expect “know”
to have one content when predicated of non-epistemologists, and
another when predicated of epistemologists.
The fact that the contextualist is operating with the incorrect
model of context-sensitivity opens them up to objections that they
would not otherwise face. But the situation is worse for the contextu-
alist. If the model of context-sensitivity assumed by the contextualist
is wrong, a great deal of what contextualists say about the virtues of
their theories over other theories is vitiated.
If shifts in standards for knowledge can occur with a discourse,
some of the paradigm sentences the infelicity of which supposedly
motivates their accounts over rival accounts turn out to be felici-
tous and potentially true by contextualist lights. For example, if
“know” can, like other context-sensitive expressions, change its
interpretation within a clause, one would expect the following to
be felicitous:
(38) a. If Bill has hands, then Bill knows that he has hands, but
Bill does not know that he is not a bodiless brain in a
vat.
b. If Bill has hands, Bill does not know that he is not a
bodiless brain in a vat, but Bill knows he has hands.
Keith DeRose calls sentences such as these “Abominable Conjunc-
tions” (1995, pp. 27–29), and takes the infelicity of utterances of
the sentences in (38) to undermine Robert Nozick’s account of
skepticism on the grounds that it allows for acceptable utterances of
these sentences. But if “know” is context-sensitive, then it would be
mysterious why the sentences in (38) wouldn’t be smoothly accept-
able. Felicitous utterances of these sentences would simply involve
“know” shifting its standards across a conjunction.
Contextualists do in general claim that there are special rules
governing the context-sensitivity of “know.” In particular, once a
skeptical possibility has been raised, they say, that has ramifications
for the evaluation of future uses of “know” within that discourse. In
particular, once standards have been raised, it is not possible to lower
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them again.16 But (37) and (38a) involve standard shifting within a
sentence that is tantamount to the raising of standards. So appeal to
this feature of contextualism does not help the contextualist.
5. AMBIGUITY AND LOOSE USE
It is worthwhile briefly considering two options that may seem open
to the contextualist; ambiguity and loose use. Contextualists such as
Cohen, DeRose, and Lewis have, to their credit, not presented their
views in these terms. In this section, I briefly explain some of the
reasons why they are right not to have so presented their views.
There is really not much to be said for a version of contextu-
alism according to which “know” is ambiguous. To ground an
ambiguity claim linguistically, one would need to show that there
are languages in which the different meanings are represented by
different words. But such a claim is unlikely to be substantiated
in the cases of interest to the contextualist. It is quite unlikely that
there are languages in which the word for “know” in the epistem-
ology classroom is different than the word for “know” outside the
epistemology classroom (of course, stranger things have happened
. . .).
The more interesting case involves loose use. Suppose a
contextualist were to present her claims in these terms. Then, on
this view, when “standards are low”, one is using “know” loosely,
and this is why it is acceptable to predicate a knowledge-state of
someone who only has weak inductive evidence for the truth of one
of her (true) beliefs. When “standards are high”, then “know” is used
strictly, and it is not acceptable to attribute knowledge to that person
in that situation.
Here are some typical cases of loose use. One may utter “France
is hexagonal”, to describe the rough shape of France. Though intui-
tively France is not “strictly” hexagonal, such an utterance can
be felicitously made. Similarly, suppose someone utters “It’s three
o’clock” when asked the time at 3:03. Her response can be felici-
tous, even though it is not intuitively “strictly” true. Finally, suppose
that in a village, there is a person Mary with a small amount of
medical training, and no one else has any medical training at all. In
context, it may be appropriate to utter “Mary is the doctor of the
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village”, though it is intuitively not strictly true. These are all cases
in which, intuitively, language is used “loosely”.17
There are two kinds of accounts one could envisage of such cases.
According to the first, and by far the most natural, utterances of
such sentences express propositions that are literally false, but the
utterances are nevertheless pragmatically acceptable. On the second
account, utterances of such sentences express propositions that are
literally true.
Suppose the contextualist took the first account, according to
which loose use involved the expression of literally false proposi-
tions despite pragmatic felicity. On such an account, ordinary
knowledge attributions that are generally held to be true would
be pragmatically felicitous, but would express false propositions.
Only when someone satisfies strict epistemological standards could
an atomic knowledge attribution to that person be true. On this
view, we generally speak falsely when we attribute knowledge to
our fellow epistemic citizens, though we are not thereby violating
conversational norms.
But this is obviously an unsatisfactory position way to present
the contextualist view. For this position is simply epistemological
skepticism. Ordinary knowledge attributions are generally false. But
skepticism was precisely the view that the contextualist position
was supposed to help us evade. Therefore, the contextualist position
cannot be presented as the view that knowledge-ascriptions are used
loosely, where loose use is understood on the pragmatic model.
Therefore, if contextualism about knowledge-attributions is
supposed to be understood on the model of loose use, then its
proponents must have a semantic account of loose use. I do not
pretend to understand what would motivate a semantic account of
loose use. After all, the common feature to cases of loose use is that
they seem to be cases in which it is felicitous to describe some-
thing as satisfying a predicate, despite the fact that the thing in
question does not satisfy the predicate, when it is taken literally.
A semantic account of loose use is prima facie odd, since one might
think that in order for something to satisfy a predicate semantically,
it must at least satisfy the literal meaning of that predicate. To
attempt to capture loose use semantically seems therefore to miss
the phenomenon being described.
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Be that as it may, suppose one adopted a semantic account of
loose use, and couched contextualism about “know” as the thesis
that “know”, like paradigm cases of loose use, can be used loosely.
Then an ordinary atomic knowledge attribution to someone with
only weak inductive evidence for one of her true belief’s can express
a truth proposition, because it is used loosely, and loose talk is a
semantic, rather than a solely pragmatic phenomenon.
But what would it mean to present contextualism along the lines
of a semantic account of loose use? It is not sufficient to say that
a semantic account of loose use is one according to which “know”
expresses different properties in different contexts. For this is true
of any context-dependent account. Constructions involving context-
sensitive gradable adjectives such as “tall” or “flat” involve some
expression having different contents in different contexts, but this
does not mean that they are best modeled by appeal to “loose use.”
It is not that “tall” is being used loosely, as in the paradigm cases
above, when an eight year old child who is five feet tall is described
as “tall.” It is rather that “tall” (or some expression associated with
it) can have different contents in different contexts, consistent with
it being used perfectly literally. A contextualist theory of knowl-
edge attributions modeled along the lines of loose use (construed
semantically) is therefore not just a view according to which knowl-
edge attributions can change their contents across contexts. It must
rather flow from some rather tight analogy between paradigm cases
of loose use and knowledge attributions. On this account, it is
because knowledge-attributions in ordinary contexts are like uttering
at 3:03 p.m. the sentence “It is three o’clock” that they can be
truthfully asserted. The point of the analogy between knowledge-
attributions and loose talk would then be to free the contextualist
from having to relate knowledge attributions to constructions such
as comparative adjectives and other context-sensitive constructions
that (unlike “know”) are gradable or can engage in sentence-internal
context-shifts.
So, a contextualist “loose talk” account of knowledge is one
according to which knowledge-attributions are context-sensitive “in
the same sense” as it is permissible to describe 3:03 p.m. as satis-
fying the predicate “is three o’clock”, and France as satisfying
the predicate “is hexagonal.” But now it seems that this version
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of contextualism would face a similar charge as the pragmatic
loose talk version of contextualism. According to this version
of contextualism, Hannah only can satisfy the predicate “knows
that she has hands” in the sense that France can satisfy the
predicate “is hexagonal”, 3:03 p.m. can satisfy the predicate “is
three o’clock”, and someone with rudimentary medical training can
satisfy the predicate “is a doctor.” This is not a very satisfying way
of “rescuing” ordinary knowledge-attributions. Indeed, one may
wonder whether it has any advantages over skepticism at all.
So, contextualists have in general been correct not to employ
either the ambiguity or “loose talk” versions of their theses. The
former seems subject to empirical refutation, and the latter seems
no different than the skeptical positions they rightly reject.18
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have raised some worries that militate against
the postulation of semantic context-dependence in ascriptions of
propositional knowledge. First, propositional knowledge ascriptions
are not gradable. Secondly, the general model for most context-
sensitive expressions is that the relevant context-sensitivity is linked
to a term, and not the sentence or the discourse. This feature is
lacking in the case of the alleged context-sensitivity of knowl-
edge-ascriptions. Finally, I have discussed alternative strategies
to establishing the context-sensitivity of knowledge-ascriptions;
first, Cohen’s argument from the alleged context-sensitivity of
“justified” to the context-sensitivity of knowledge-ascriptions, and
secondly the strategy of modeling the alleged context-sensitivity of
knowledge-ascriptions upon cases of loose use. In each case, I have
found the relevant strategy problematic.
But if ascriptions of propositional knowledge are not semanti-
cally context-sensitive, how might one capture the intuitive evidence
that Cohen, DeRose, Lewis, and others have brought to our atten-
tion? My own favored strategy is to employ an account of knowl-
edge according to which a subject’s knowledge can vary over
time, as a function of the changing interests of the subject (see
Stanley, forthcoming). Such a view is not contextualist, because
the interests of the knowledge-attributor are irrelevant to the truth
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of the knowledge-claim (unless the attributor is the subject of the
ascription).19 This view has the virtue of providing an explanation
of how changing goals and interests can result in fluctuations in
what we know, without the problematic linguistic commitments of
contextualism.
NOTES
∗ The paper I gave at the conference has subsequently split into two papers. The
other descendant of the original paper (Stanley, forthcoming) focuses on devel-
oping a non-contextualist account of knowledge that captures the intuitive data
as well as contextualism. Discussion with the participants at the conference at the
University of Massachusetts was very helpful. I should single out John Hawthorne
and my commentator Barbara Partee for special mention; e-mails with Stewart
Cohen since then have also been invaluable. I am also indebted for discussion
to Herman Cappelen, Keith DeRose, Tamar Gendler, Richard Heck, Jim Joyce,
Chris Kennedy, Jeffrey King, Ernie Lepore, Peter Ludlow, Robert Stalnaker, and
Timothy Williamson.
1 I, along with many philosophers and linguists, am convinced that they are
context-sensitive. Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore have, however, argued that
they are not context sensitive, and that there is just one property e.g. of smallness,
that both buildings and people can have. Ken Taylor (p.c.) also has this view.
2 Another feature of gradable expressions is that they can typically occur with
measure phrases. For instance, “tall”, “wide”, and “old”, co-occur with measure
phrases, as in “Five feet tall”, “two feet wide”, and “30 years old”. There is no
natural measure phrase with ‘know’, even though it doesn’t seem to be like the
‘negative’ comparative adjective, like ‘flat’, ‘small’, and ‘young’. I will not pursue
this disanalogy in what follows.
3 It appears that the use of “really” in the description of the bank case is rather a
hedge, in the sense of Paul Kay (1997). A hedge is some expression the linguistic
function of which is to comment on the appropriateness of asserting the embedded
sentence (as in uses of meta-linguistic negation such as “John isn’t happy, he’s
ecstatic”). One such hedge, according to Kay (ibid., pp. 140ff.), is the expression
“technically”, as in “Technically, that isn’t water.” The occurrence of “really” in
the bank case appears to be a hedge in this sense – at the end of the discourse
Hannah is conceding the infelicity of asserting that she knows that the bank is
open. Note that this is consistent with it being perfectly true throughout that she
knows that the bank is open.
4 As Fred Dretske (2000, note 1) writes, concerning such examples, “I take
such constructions to be describing not better knowledge, but more direct, more
compelling kinds of evidence.” Of course, if evidence is just knowledge, as
Williamson (2000, Chapter 9) has argued, Dretske’s explanation is less
compelling.
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5 As Nunberg, Sag, and Wasow (1994) emphasize, idiomaticity is a matter of
degree, ranging from completely frozen idioms such as “kick the bucket” to some-
what less frozen idioms. “Knows better than anyone” is intermediate on the scale
of idiomaticity.
6 Lewis (1996, p. 562), assuming that “know” is gradable, writes: “Take the
far-fetched possibility that Possum has somehow managed to get into a closed
drawer of the desk – maybe he jumped in when it was open, then I closed it
without noticing him. That possibility could be eliminated by opening the drawer
and making a thorough examination. But if uneliminated, it may nevertheless be
ignored, and in many contexts that ignoring would be proper. If I look all around
the study, but without checking the closed drawers of the desk, I may truly be
said to know that Possum is not in the study . . . But if I did check all the closed
drawers, then I would know better that Possum is not in the study.” Lewis does
not seem to notice that the last sentence is in fact not grammatical.
7 Even though “regret” is gradable, it is not clear that it is context-sensitive. I
see no reason to deny that regretting a proposition involves having over a certain
context-invariant level of regret (though it is of course vague what this degree is).
What this suggests is that the fact that an expression is gradable is independent of
the question of whether it is context-sensitive (see below).
8 Thanks to John Hawthorne and Angelika Kratzer for pressing me on the
analogy between epistemic modals and “know”.
9 I owe example (27a) to Jeff King and (27b) to Jamie Tappenden.
10 See Stanley and Williamson (2001).
11 In the case of (27a), the “well” modifies the swimming, rather than the knowl-
edge. The claim can be represented “John knows [how to swim well].” Sentences
such as “John knows well how to swim”, where “well” is made to apply to the
knowledge relation, are clearly not felicitous. Finally, “well”, in such uses, is not
a degree modifier.
12 Of course it is true that “vacuum”, like all words, can be used loosely. This is
of no use to the contextualism (see section 4).
13 When a possessive is used with a relational noun such as “enemy”, it forces
a reading in which the possession relation is determined by the nature of the
noun (e.g. “John’s brother”). There are uses of such constructions in which the
possession relation can be assigned a different reading (suppose John is one of a
group of police officers each of whom is interviewing one of the four brothers’ of
the suspect in a crime). But it is not clear that such cases are genuine readings of
the possessive, rather than deferred reference of some kind.
14 I am especially indebted to numerous discussions with Stewart Cohen in
writing this section.
15 Thanks to David Chalmers for pushing me to consider “nearby”, and Barbara
Partee for pushing me to consider “enemy”.
16 I argue in my (forthcoming) that this feature of the contextualist view is
considerably more ad hoc than has been previously recognized.
17 My own suspicion is that there is no uniform phenomenon behind “loose
use”.
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18 There are various other models and analogies I have not considered. For
example, Stewart Cohen (p.c.) has suggested to me that “hit” is context-sensitive;
in a society in which people regularly have strong friendly physical contact, one
might have to strike someone with greater force than one actually does in order
to count as “hitting” that person. So “hit” is context-sensitive. However, I do not
find this persuasive. First, hitting is not just about the force of the contact; it is
also about the intention behind the contact. It is not clear the force is all that
relevant to whether or not a strike counts as a hit. Secondly, and more impor-
tantly, the context-sensitivity of a term is not well-established by appealing to
societies with different customs. For one runs the risk of thereby describing a
society in which that term has a slightly different meaning. A plausible account
of Cohen’s example is that “hit” means something slightly different in the society
he envisages. To model the alleged context-sensitivity of “know” upon this kind
of possible variation for “hit” would then be to endorse the ambiguity model.
19 For discussion of the distinctions between contextualism and this sort of
view, see also Cohen (1991), DeRose (1999) (who calls the latter sort of view
“subject contextualism”), and Hawthorne (forthcoming, Chapter 4), who calls it
“Subject-Sensitive Moderate Invariantism.”
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